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Abstract
In this paper we propose the use of neural interference as the origin of quantum-
like effects in the brain. We do so by using a neural oscillator model consistent
with neurophysiological data. The model used was shown elsewhere to reproduce
well the predictions of behavioral stimulus-response theory. The quantum-like
effects are brought about by the spreading activation of incompatible oscilla-
tors, leading to an interference-like effect mediated by inhibitory and excitatory
synapses.
Keywords: disjunction effect, quantum cognition, quantum-like model, neural
oscillators, stimulus-response theory
1. Introduction
Quantum mechanics is one of the most successful scientific theories in his-
tory. From it, detailed predictions and extremely precise descriptions of a wide
range of physical systems are given. Thus, it is not surprising that researchers
from social and behavioral sciences disciplines started asking whether the ap-
paratus of quantum mechanics could be useful to them (Khrennikov, 2010). In
applying the quantum formalism, most researchers do not claim to have found
social or behavioral phenomena that are determined by the physical laws of
quantum mechanics (Bruza et al., 2009). Instead, they claim that by using
the representation of states in a Hilbert space, together with the correspond-
ing non-Kolmogorovian interference of probabilities, a better description of ob-
served phenomena could be achieved. To distinguish the idea that the formalism
describing a system is quantum without requiring the system itself to be, re-
searchers often use the term quantum-like.
One of the first applications of quantum-like dynamics outside of physics was
in finances (Baaquie, 1997; Haven, 2002) and in decision making (Busemeyer et al.,
2006; Aerts, 2009). In economy, Baaquie (1997) showed that a more general
form of the Black-Scholes option pricing equation was given by a Schrödinger-
type equation, and Haven (2002) linked the equivalent of the Plank constant to
the existence of arbitrage in the model. In psychology, most of the initial ef-
fort was focused on using quantum-like dynamics and Hilbert-space formalisms
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to describe discrepancies between empirical data and “classical” models using
standard probability theory (see, for example, Aerts (2009); Asano et al. (2010);
Busemeyer et al. (2006); Busemeyer and Wang (2007); Busemeyer et al. (2009);
Khrennikov (2009); Khrennikov and Haven (2009); Khrennikov (2011)).
To try to describe quantum-like effects in cognitive sciences, in a recent paper
Khrennikov (2011) used a classical electromagnetic-field model for the mental
processing of information. In it, Khrennikov argues that the collective activity
of neurons involved in mental processing produces electromagnetic signals. Such
signals then propagate in the brain, leading to interference and the appearance
of quantum-like correlations. He used this model to show how quantum-like
effects help understand the binding problem.
In this paper we set forth a neural oscillator model exhibiting many of the
characteristics of Khrennikov’s. The neural model we employ was initially pro-
posed as an attempt to obtain behavioral stimulus-response theory from the
neuronal activities in the brain (Suppes et al., 2012). There are many different
ways to use neural oscillators to model learning (see Vassilieva et al., 2011,
and references therein), but to our knowledge, this is the only one that makes
a clear connection between neural oscillator computations and the behavioral
responses. Furthermore, the model is simple enough to help understand the
basic principles behind the computation of a response from a stimulus without
compromising the neurophysiological interpretation of it. This must be empha-
sized, as most neural models constructed from a neurophysiological basis are so
computationally intensive and complex that it is very hard to understand why
or how one response was select instead of another. We shall see later that this
is not the case with Suppes et al. (2012).
As with Khrennikov’s electromagnetic field model, our model has many
quantum-like characteristics, such as signaling, superposition, and interference.
However, it does not rely on the propagation of electromagnetic fields in the
brain. Instead, we show that these quantum-like effects could be obtained by
directly considering the interference of the activities of collections of firing neu-
rons coupled via inhibitory and excitatory synapses. In particular, we show a
violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle, often cited as an example of quantum-
like behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce Suppes, de
Barros, and Oas’s (2012) oscillator model, with special emphasis to its neu-
rophysiological interpretation and connection to SR theory. Then, in section
3.1, we present a contextual theory of quantum-like phenomena coming from
classical interference of waves (de Barros and Suppes, 2009). Finally, in section
2 we show computer simulations of neural oscillators and how they fit some
quantum-like experimental data in the literature. We end with some remarks.
2. Neural oscillator model of SR-theory
In this section, we delineate the modeling of SR theory by neural oscillators.
This section is divided into three parts. First, in subsection 2.1 we sketch the
mathematical version of behavioral SR theory we model. Then, in subsection
2
2.2 we present the model of Suppes et al. (2012) in a qualitative way. Finally,
in subsection 2.3 we give a mathematical description of the oscillator model.
Our goal is not to be exhaustive, but only to focus on the main features of
the model that are relevant for the emergence of quantum-like effects derived
later. Readers interested in more detail are referred to (Suppes et al., 2012;
de Barros et al., 2012).
2.1. Review of SR theory
Stimulus-response theory (or SR theory) is one of the most successful be-
havioral learning theories in psychology (Suppes and Atkinson, 1960). Among
the many reasons for its success, it has been shown to fit well empirical data
in a variety of experiments. This fitting requires few parameters (the learning
probability c and the number of stimuli), giving it strong prediction powers from
few assumptions. Also, because it requires a rigid trial structure, its concepts
can be formally axiomatized, resulting in many important non-trivial experi-
ments. Finally, despite its simplicity, SR theory is rich enough such that even
language can be represented within its framework (Suppes, 2002). Thus, SR
theory presents an ideal mathematical structure to be modeled at a neuronal
level1.
Here we present the mathematical version of SR theory for a continuum of re-
sponses, formalized in terms of a stochastic process (here we follow Suppes et al.,
2012). Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let Z, S, R, and E be random
variables, with Z : Ω → E|S| S : Ω → S, R : Ω → R, and E : Ω → E, where
S is the set of stimuli, R the set of responses, and E the set of reinforcements.
Then a trial in SR theory has the following structure:
Zn → Sn → Rn → En → Zn+1. (1)
Intuitively, the trial structure works the following way. Trial n starts with a
certain state of conditioning and a sampled stimulus. Once a stimulus is sam-
pled, a response is computed according to the state of conditioning. Then,
reinforcement follows, which can lead (with probability c) to a new state of con-
ditioning for trial n + 1 . In more detail, at the beginning of a trial, the state
of conditioning is represented by the random variable Zn =
(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
.
The vector
(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
associates to each stimuli si ∈ S, i = 1, . . . ,m,
where m = |S| is the cardinality of S, a value z(n)i on trial n. Once a stimulus
Sn = si is sampled with probability P (Sn = si|siǫS) = 1
m
, its corresponding
z
(n)
i determines the probability of responses in R by the probability distribution
K
(
r|z(n)i
)
, i.e. P
(
a1 ≤ Rn ≤ a2|Sn = si,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
=
´ a2
a1
k
(
x|z(n)i
)
dx,
1SR theory, in the form presented here, has lost most of its support among learning theo-
rists, mainly because of of inability to satisfactorly explain certain experiments (Mackintosh,
1983). However, many of its theorems are relevant to current neurophysiological experiments.
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where k
(
x|z(n)i
)
is the probability density associate to the distribution, and
where Zn,i is the i-th component of the vector
(
z
(n)
1 , . . . , z
(n)
m
)
. The probability
distribution K
(
r|z(n)i
)
is the smearing distribution, and it is determined by its
variance and mode z
(n)
i . The next step is the reinforcement En, which is ef-
fective with probability c, i.e. P
(
Zn+1,i = y|Sn = si,En = y,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
= c
and P
(
Zn+1,i = z
(n)
i |Sn = si,En = y,Zn,i = z(n)i
)
= 1−c. The trial ends with
a new (with probability c) state of conditioning Zn+1.
2.2. Qualitative description of oscillator model
Because of its focus on behavioral outcomes, mathematical SR theory does
not provide a clear connection to the internal processing of information by the
brain. To bridge this gap, Suppes et al. (2012) proposed a neural-oscillator
based response computation model able to reproduce the main stochastic fea-
tures of SR theory, including the conditional probabilities for a continuum of
responses. It is this model that we describe qualitatively in this subsection.
In SR theory, a trial is given by the sequence in (1). In the oscillator model,
with the exception of Zn, each random variable is represented by a corresponding
oscillator. To better understand the model, let us examine each step of an SR
trial in terms of oscillators.
Let us start with the sampling of a stimulus, Sn. At the beginning of a trial,
a (distal) stimulus is presented. Through the perceptual system processing, it
reaches an area of the brain where it produces a somewhat synchronized firing
of a set of neurons. This set of firing neurons is what we think as the activation
of the sampled stimulus oscillator2, Os (t). The oscillator Os (t) is a simplified
description of the semi-periodic activity of the collection of (perhaps thousands
of) neurons.
We now turn to the computation of a response, Rn. For simplicity, we first
consider two possible responses, R1 and R2 (i.e. R = {R1, R2}); later we show
how we generalize to any number of to a continuum of responses. Once Os (t) is
activated, its couplings to other neurons may lead to a spreading of its activation
to other sets of neurons, including the response neurons. Say we can split the
neurons activated by Os (t)’s couplings into two sets, one representing R1 and
the other R2. Since those neurons were activated, as the stimulus neurons, they
fire in relative synchrony, and can be represented by the oscillators Or1 (t) and
Or2 (t). Of course, the activation of both Or1 (t) and Or2 (t) is not enough for the
computation of a response. To see how a response is computed in the oscillator
model from Or1 (t) and Or2 (t), we need think of what happens if two oscillators
are in-phase or out-of-phase. When two neural oscillators are in phase, the
firing of one adds to the firing of the other, perhaps reaching a certain response
2We limit our discussion to a single stimulus oscillator, but its generalization to N stimuli
is straightforward.
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threshold; if they are out of phase, such threshold may not be reached, as the
firings do not add above their activated intensities. So, a response is chosen
depending on the relative phases of the oscillators. If Os (t) is in phase with
Or1 (t) and out of phase with Or2 (t), response R1 is selected. Which response
is selected depends on the actual couplings between Os (t), Or1 (t), and Or2 (t)
(see next subsection for details).
We can now talk about En, Zn, and Zn+1. Since the selected response is
determined by the couplings between neural oscillators, clearly the state of con-
ditioning Zn depends on those couplings. Therefore, on the oscillator model,
saying that a trial starts with a state of conditioning Zn is the same as say-
ing that a trial starts with a set of synaptic connections between the neurons
belonging to the ensembles representing the activated stimulus and responses.
But, as the reinforcement En may change Zn into a different state of condi-
tioning, Zn+1, it follows that during reinforcement the neural couplings need to
change. So, in the oscillator model, such couplings change when a neural rein-
forcement oscillator (corresponding to the activation of an ensemble of neurons
representing reinforcement) interacts with the stimulus and response oscillators,
thus driving a Hebb-like change in synaptic connection, resulting in learning.
The previous paragraphs summarize qualitatively the model, but there are
three points that need to be further discussed before we proceed to the quan-
titative description. First, since neural oscillators correspond to a tremendous
dimensional reduction in the neuronal dynamical system, we need to justify their
use. Second, as it is crucial for the model, an argument needs to be made as to
how oscillators synchronize. Finally, we should the two-response case, but how
can a finite number of oscillators encode a large number of responses, possibly
a continuum of responses?
Why neural oscillators? First, we note that Suppes et al. (2012) does not
propose the use of neural oscillators for any type of modeling. Instead, they
argue that if we are interested in higher cognitive functions, such as language,
it can be showed that they can be represented on electroencephalogram (EEG)
oscillation patterns (see Suppes, 2002, Chapter 8, and corresponding refer-
ences). But EEG signals are the result of a large assembly of neurons firing
synchronously or quasi-synchronously (Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006). Thus, we
can think of a word as represented in the brain by a set of coupled neurons.
When this word is activated by an external stimulus, this set of neurons fire
coherently. Such an ensemble of synchronizing neurons could, in first approxi-
mation, be represented by a periodic function FT (t), where T is the period of
the function3. So, for Suppes et al. (2012) a neural oscillator is simply a set of
firing neurons represented by such periodic functions, and a good candidate as
a unit of processing of information in the brain.
It must be emphasized that representing a collection of neurons by a periodic
function, as we did above, does not mean that all neurons fire simultaneously.
3We remark that neurons in this ensemble do not need to fire at the same time, but only
that their frequencies synchronize. They may still be in synchrony but out of phase.
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It just means that the firing frequencies of individual neurons become very close
to each other. But neurons with the same frequency do not need to fire at
the same times. In other words, they may synchronize out of phase. But, more
importantly, once they synchronize, the initial dynamical system with thousands
of degrees of freedom become describable by a single dynamical variable, the
periodic function FT (t). It is this dramatic dimensional reduction that allows
us to produce a model whose behavior we can understand in certain specific
situations.
We now move to the question of how neural oscillators synchronize. Let us
first look at the qualitative behavior of individual neurons in two ensembles,
A and B, each with a large number of neurons firing coherently. Let nA be a
single neuron in ensemble A firing with period TA, and let nB be another neu-
ron in B firing with period TB. Let t
′ be a particular time such that nB would
fire if A were not activated, i.e. the time it would fire because of its natural
periodicity TB. If nA and nB are synaptically coupled, a firing of nA at a time
t / t′ would anticipate nB’s firing to a time t′′ closer to t, thus approaching
the timing of firing for both neurons4. If more neurons from ensemble A are
coupled to nB, the stronger the effect of anticipating its firing time. Further-
more, since nB is also coupled to neurons in A, its firing has the same effect
on A (though this effect does not need to be symmetric). So, the couplings
between A and B lead both periods TA and TB to approach each other, i.e., A
and B synchronize. In fact, it is possible to prove mathematically that, under
the right conditions, if the number of neurons is large enough, the sum of the
several weak synaptic interactions can cause a strong effect, making all neurons
fire close together (Izhikevich, 2007). In other words, even when weakly coupled,
two neural ensembles represented by oscillators may synchronize.
We end this subsection with the representation of a continuum of responses in
terms of neural oscillators. Continuum of responses show up in some behavioral
experiments. For example, a possible task could be to predict the position of an
airplane on a radar screen (represented by a flashing dot appearing periodically)
after observing its position for several trials. Since the radar position can be
anywhere in the screen, this cannot be represented by a discrete set of responses.
So, how could we represent a continuum of responses with neural oscillators?
With a discrete number of responses, what we did was to create a representation
for each response in terms of a distinct oscillator (in our example above, Or1 (t)
and Or2 (t)). But this approach would lead to an uncountable number of neural
oscillators for the continuum case, clearly a physically unreasonable assumption.
But there is another alternative. When we used oscillators for the two responses,
we thought aboutOr1 (t) andOr2 (t) as being either in phase or out of phase with
Os (t). However, they do not need to be in perfect phase. In the next section,
we show that by using specific differences of phase between Or1 (t) and Or2 (t)
and Os (t), we can control the amount of “intensity” of a neural activation on
4This is true for excitatory synapses. As we shall see later on this paper, inhibitory synapses
will play a different yet important role.
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each oscillator. This relative intensity between Or1 (t) and Or2 (t) can be used
as a measure of how close a response is to either R1 or R2; in other words, we
can think of the response as being between R1 and R2, which would correspond
to a continuum. So, by thinking of R1 and R2 as extremes in a possible range of
responses in a continuum interval, the relative intensities of Or1 (t) and Or2 (t),
given by their phase relation with Os (t), could code any response in between.
2.3. Quantitative description of the oscillator model
We now turn to a more rigorous mathematical description. Our underlying
assumption is that we have two neural ensembles A and B described by periodic
functions FTA (t) and FTB (t) with periods TA and TB, respectively. Without
loss of generality in our argument, we assume that FTA (t) and FTB (t) have
the same shape, i.e., there exists a constant c such that FTA (t) = FTB (tc).
A simple way to describe the synchronization of A and B is to rewrite the
time argument in the functions, rewriting them as FTA (tαA) and FTB (tαB).
Clearly, if no couplings exist between A and B, their dynamics is not modified
and αA = αB = 1. However, when the ensembles are couples, αA and αB
are a function of time, their synchronization means that they evolve such that
FTA (tαA (t)) = FTB (tαB (t)). Thus, when we are studying the dynamics of
coupled neural oscillators, it suffices to study the dynamics of the arguments of
FTA and FTB above, which we call their phases.
To illustrate this point, let us imagine a simple case where when there is no
interaction A follows a harmonic oscillator with angular frequency ωA = 2π/TA.
Then FTA (t) = A cos (ωAt+ δA), where and δA is a constant, and expressions
hold for FTB (t). Following the above paragraph, we rewrite
FTA (t) = A cos (ϕA (t)) ,
where
ϕA (t) = ωAt+ δA (2)
is the phase. Let us now focus on the phase dynamics.
For a set of coupled phase oscillators, Kuramoto (1984) proposed a simple set
of dynamical equations for ϕA (t). To better understand them, let us assume
that in the absence of interactions ϕA evolves according to (2). Thus, the
differential equation describing ϕA would be
dϕA (t)
dt
= ωA, (3)
and for ϕB ,
dϕB (t)
dt
= ωB. (4)
In the presence of a synchronizing interaction, Kuramoto proposed that equa-
tions (3) and (4) should be replaced by
dϕA (t)
dt
= ωA − kAB sin (ϕA (t)− ϕB (t)) , (5)
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and for ϕB ,
dϕB (t)
dt
= ωB − kBA sin (ϕB (t)− ϕA (t)) . (6)
It is easy to see how equations (5) and (6) work. When the phases ϕA and ϕB
are close to each other, we can linearize the sine term, and rewrite equations
(5) and (6) as
dϕA (t)
dt
∼= ωAt− kAB (ϕA (t)− ϕB (t)) , (7)
and for ϕB ,
dϕB (t)
dt
∼= ωBt− kBA (ϕB (t)− ϕA (t)) . (8)
The effect of the added term in equation (7) is to make the instantaneous fre-
quency increase above its natural frequency ωA if ϕB is greater than ϕA, and
decrease otherwise. In other words, it pushes the phases ϕA and ϕB towards
synchronization. We should emphasize that Kuramoto’s equations were pro-
posed for a large number of oscillators, and his goal was to find exact solutions
for such large systems. However, as we described above, his equations also
make sense for systems with small number of oscillators (for applications of
Kuramoto’s equations to systems with small number of oscillators, in addition
to Suppes et al. (2012), see also Billock and Tsou (2005, 2011); Seliger et al.
(2002); Trevisan et al. (2005) and references therein). For a set of N coupled
phase oscillators, Kuramoto’s equations are
dϕi (t)
dt
= ωi −
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
kij sin (ϕi (t)− ϕj (t)) . (9)
But independent of whether we have large or small number of oscillators or not,
it is possible to prove that for oscillating dynamical systems near a bifurcation
(which is the case for many neuronal models), Kuramoto’s equations present a
first order approximation for the synchronizing coupled dynamics (Izhikevich,
2007).
In the model proposed in (Suppes et al., 2012), each stimulus in the set S of
stimuli corresponds to an oscillator, i.e. there are m stimulus neural oscillators,
{si (t)}, i = 1, . . . , N . Here we use the notation si (t) to distinguish between the
oscillator and the actual stimulus si ∈ S. Once a distal stimulus is presented,
the processing of the proximal stimulus leads, after sensory processing, to the
activation of neurons in the brain corresponding to a neural oscillator repre-
sentation of such stimulus. Once a stimulus oscillator is activated by starting
to fire synchronously, a set of response oscillators, r1 (t) and r2 (t), connected
to the active stimulus oscillator via the couplings ksi,rj and kr1,r2 lead to the
synchronization of the stimulus and response oscillators. The couplings ksi,rj
and kr1,r2 correspond to the state of conditioning in SR-theory. Depending on
the details of the synchronization dynamics, as explained below, a response is
selected (this being the equivalent of sampling Xn). Finally, during reinforce-
ment, a reinforcement oscillator ey (t) is activated, and its couplings with si (t),
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r1 (t), and r2 (t), together with ksi,rj and kr1,r2 , leads to a dynamics that allow
for changes in ksi,rj and kr1,r2 , which accounts for the last step in the SR trial
(1), with a new state of conditioning.
Before we detail the dynamics of the oscillator model, it is important to
discuss how si (t), r1 (t), and r2 (t) can encode a response through their cou-
plings, and how can we interpret such couplings. Let us write the case where
si is sampled, and let us assume that once the dynamics is acting, all oscilla-
tors synchronize, acquiring the same frequency (though perhaps with a phase
difference). Then,
si(t) = A cos (ϕsi(t)) = A cos (ω0t) , (10)
r1(t) = A cos (ϕr1(t)) = A cos (ω0t+ δφ1) , (11)
r2(t) = A cos (ϕr2(t)) = A cos (ω0t+ δφ2) , (12)
where s(t), r1(t), and r2(t) represent harmonic oscillations, ϕs(t), ϕr1(t), and
ϕr2(t) their phases, δφ1 and δφ2 are constants, and A their amplitude, assumed
to be the same. As argued in (Suppes et al., 2012), since neural oscillators have
a wave-like behavior (Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006), their dynamics satisfy the
principle of superposition, thus making oscillators prone to interference effects.
As such, the mean intensity in time gives us a measure of the excitation of the
neurons in the neural oscillators. For the superposition of s(t) and r1(t),
I1 =
〈
(si(t) + r1(t))
2
〉
t
=
〈
s(t)2
〉
t
+
〈
r1(t)
2
〉
t
+ 〈2s(t)r1(t)〉t ,
where
〈f (t)〉t = lim
T→∞
1
T
ˆ T
0
f (t) dt
is the time average. It is easy to compute that
I1 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ1)) ,
and
I2 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ2)) .
From the above equations, the maximum intensity for each superposition is 2A2,
and the minimum is zero. Thus, the maximum difference between I1 and I2
happens when their relative phases are π. We also expect a maximum contrast
between I1 and I2 when a response is not in between the responses represented
by the oscillators r1 (t) and r2 (t). For in between responses, we should expect
less contrast, with the minimum contrast happening when the response lies on
the mid-point of the continuum between the responses associated to r1(t) and
r2(t). The ideal balance of responses happen if we impose
δφ1 = δφ2 + π ≡ δφ, (13)
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which results in
I1 = A
2 (1 + cos (δφ)) , (14)
and
I2 = A
2 (1− cos (δφ)) . (15)
From equations (14) and (15), let x ∈ [−1, 1] be the normalized difference in
intensities between r1 and r2, i.e.
x ≡ I1 − I2
I1 + I2
= cos (δϕ) , (16)
0 ≤ δϕ ≤ π. The parameter x codifies the dispute between response oscillators
r1 (t) and r2 (t). So, we can use arbitrary phase differences between oscillators
to code for a continuum of responses between −1 and 1.
As we mentioned above, the dynamics of the phase oscillators leading to
(10)–(12) are modeled here by Kuramoto equations (9). However, as we also
mentioned, (9) leads to the synchronization of all oscillators with the same
phase, which is not what we need to code responses according to equation (16).
Naturally, Kuramoto’s equations need to be modified to encode the phase dif-
ferences δϕ in (10)–(12). This can be accomplished by adding a term inside the
sine, resulting in
dϕi (t)
dt
= ωi −
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
kij sin (ϕi (t)− ϕj (t) + δij) . (17)
The main problem with such change is how to interpret it. Equation (9) had a
clear interpretation: the firing of oscillator neurons coupled through excitatory
synapses displaced the phase of the other oscillator into synchrony. But this
interpretation does not make sense for (17). Why would oscillators be brought
close to each other, but be kept at a phase distance of δij?
To understand the origin of δij , let us rewrite (17) as
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
kij cos (δij) sin (ϕi − ϕj)
−
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
kij sin (δij) cos (ϕi − ϕj) . (18)
Since the terms involving the phase differences δij are constant, we can write
(18) as
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
[
kEij sin (ϕi − ϕj) + kIij cos (ϕi − ϕj)
]
, (19)
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where kEij ≡ kij cos (δij) and kIij ≡ kij sin (δij). Equation (17) now has a clear
interpretation: kEij makes oscillators ϕi (t) and ϕj (t) approach each other, k
E
ij
makes them move further apart. Thus, kEij corresponds to excitatory couplings
between neurons and kIij to inhibitory couplings. In other words, we give mean-
ing to equations (17) by rethinking their couplings in terms of excitatory and
inhibitory neuronal connections.
To summarize the response process, once a stimulus oscillator si (t) is acti-
vated at time ts,n on trial n, the response oscillators are also activated. Because
of the excitatory and inhibitory couplings between stimulus and response os-
cillators, after a certain time their dynamics lead to their synchronization, but
with phase differences given by (13). Here we point out that, due to stochas-
tic variations of biological origin, the initial conditions si (ts,n), r1 (ts,n), and
r2 (ts,n) vary according to the distribution
f (ϕi) =
1
σϕ
√
2π
exp
(
− ϕi
2σ2ϕ
)
. (20)
Therefore, the phase differences at the time of response, tx,n, may not be exactly
the ones given in (13), which gives an underlying explanation for a component
of the smearing distribution5. Interference between oscillators, determined by
their phase differences, leads to a relative intensity that codes a continuum
of responses according to x in equation (16). The variable x is the response
computed by the oscillators.
We now turn to learning. Here we will only present the main features of
learning relevant to this paper. The actual details are numerous, and we refer
the to (Suppes et al., 2012). For learning to happen, the couplings kEij and k
I
ij
need to change during reinforcement. Since reinforcement must have a brain
representation in terms of synchronously firing neurons, during reinforcement
a neural oscillator ϕy (t) gets activated. We assume that ϕy (t) is a fixed rep-
resentation in the brain, with frequencies that are independent of the stimulus
and response oscillators, and therefore can be represented by
ϕy (t) = ωet.
Furthermore, since ϕy is coding a response y being reinforced, from (16) the
phase of the oscillators must be related to y via
δϕ = arccos y.
5We note that we here only model the brain computation of a stimulus and response, and
not the representation of the distal stimulus into brain oscillators and the representation of
responses into actual muscle movement or sound production. Of course, those extra steps
between the stimulus and the response will lead to further smearing of the actual observed
distribution, and a detailed brain computation of K
(
r|z
(n)
i
)
should include such factors. The
interested reader should refer to Suppes et al. (2012) for details about the used parameters
and the fitting of the model to experimental data.
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During the reinforcement period, the (active) stimulus and response oscillators
evolve according to the same equations as before, but now with an extra term
due to the reinforcement oscillator, according to
dϕi
dt
= ωi −
∑
si,r1,r2
kEij sin (ϕi − ϕj)
−
∑
si,r1,r2
kE sin (ϕi − ϕj)
−K0 sin
(
ϕsj − ωet+∆i
)
, (21)
where ∆ij reflects the reinforced response y,
∆i = − (δi,r1 + δi,r2) arccos y + δi,r2π,
and where δi,j is Kronecker’s delta. During reinforcement, couplings also change
according to a Hebbian rule represented by the equations (Seliger et al., 2002)
dkEij
dt
= ǫ (K0)
[
α cos (ϕi − ϕj)− kEij
]
, (22)
and
dkIij
dt
= ǫ (K0)
[
α sin (ϕi − ϕj)− kIij
]
, (23)
where
ǫ (K0) =
{
0 if K0 < K
′
ǫ0 otherwise,
(24)
where ǫ0 ≪ ω0, α and K0 are constant during ∆te, and K ′ is a threshold
constant throughout trials (Hoppensteadt and Izhikevich, 1996a,b). We also
assume that that there is a normal probability distribution governing the cou-
pling strength K0 between the reinforcement and the other active oscillators. It
has mean K0 and standard deviation σK0 . Its density function is:
f (K0) =
1
σK0
√
2π
exp
{
− 1
2σ2K0
(
K0 −K0
)2}
. (25)
So, when a reinforcement oscillator is activated, the system evolves under the
coupled set of differential equations (21), (22), and (23).
To summarize, we described a model of SR theory in terms of neural oscilla-
tors. In such a model, stimulus and responses are represented by collections of
neurons firing in synchrony. Such collections of neurons, when coupled, synchro-
nize to each other. The relative phases of synchronization lead to interference
of sets of neurons, and such interference results in the coding of a continuum of
responses. We left our many of the details of the stochastic processes involved
in this model, as they are not necessary for this paper, but details can be found
in reference (Suppes et al., 2012).
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3. Quantum-like neural oscillator effects
In this section we discuss possible quantum-like effects in the brain and
how they can be understood in terms of oscillators. We start by discussing
what we believe are quantum-like effects in the brain. We then describe how
quantum-like effects show up in decision-making experiments. Finally, we show
that neural oscillators can reproduce such effects.
3.1. What are quantum-like effects?
As we mentioned earlier, quantum mechanics is one of the most successful
theories in history. However, such success did not come without a price, as
quantum mechanics presents a view of the world that most people would find
disturbing, to say the least. This was certainly the view of many of the founders
of quantum mechanics, such as Plank, Einstein, and Pauli. At the core of their
concerns were three characteristics of quantum mechanics: nondeterminism,
contextuality, and nonlocality. Let us examine each one of those characteristics,
and see how they can be relevant to brain processes.
We start with nondeterminism. Intuitively, a dynamical system is determin-
istic if the current state of the system completely determines the future state of
such system, and it is nondeterministic otherwise. Quantum mechanics is non-
deterministic because a quantum state only gives the probabilities for the values
of certain observables during a measurement process. Of course, nondetermin-
ism is not unique to quantum mechanics. For practical purposes, there are many
nondeterministic processes, such as the famous Brownian motion, or the tossing
of a coin. But when we toss a coin or throw a die, physicists believe that the
newtonian dynamics would allow for the computation of the final state of the
die or coin, if we were to know exactly the initial conditions, i.e., the state of the
system (Ford, 1983; Vulović and Prange, 1986). In other words, before quantum
mechanics physicists used to believe that the underlying dynamics for nonde-
terministic processes was actually deterministic; we just could not distinguish
the deterministic from the nondeterministic because we could not know enough
details about the system. But whether we can distinguish between a determin-
istic and stochastic dynamics is not the important issue (in fact sometimes we
can’t; see Suppes and de Barros (1996) for detail). The main point is that for
quantum theory the underlying dynamics is essentially nondeterministic.
Nondeterministic stochastic processes are often used in cognitive modeling
(Busemeyer and Diederich, 2010). For example, the stochastic SR theory men-
tioned above is nondeterministic, as conditioning happens probabilistically. Yet,
as in the coin tossing example, there is no reason to believe that the underlying
dynamics must be nondeterministic, as its stochasticity may come from our lack
of detailed knowledge about the brain or its biological noises (Josić et al., 2009).
So, it should be clear that when we talk about quantum-like brain processes,
nondeterminism should not play a prominent role. Insofar as nondeterminism is
concerned, there is no need to add further quantum-mechanical mathematical
or conceptual machinery to account for it in the brain.
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Now let us examine nonlocality. To discuss nonlocality, we should first dis-
cuss causality, albeit briefly (interested readers are referred to Suppes (1970)).
Let A and B be two events, and let A and B be ±1-random variables corre-
sponding to whether A and B occurred (+1 if occurred, −1 otherwise). We
say that C is a cause of A if P (A = 1|C = 1) > P (A = 1) and there not
exist a spurious cause (represented by a hidden variable D) that could account
for the correlations. Now, it is possible to prove that for some quantum sys-
tems, there are space-like events A and A′ such that A is a the cause of A′.
What is key in the previous statement is that A and A′ are space-like separated
events; in other words, whatever mechanism is making A′ influence A must be
superluminal6. This, it may be argued, is the main puzzling characteristic of
quantum processes: to understand them we need to accept superluminal cau-
sation7. However, we believe that quantum-like effects in the brain are not the
outcome of superluminal causation. The brain is small, of the order of tens
of centimeters, and an electromagnetic field would only need of the order of
10−10 seconds to travel the whole brain. Given that brain processes are orders
of magnitude slower than 10−10 seconds, no phenomena in the brain could not
be accounted for non-superluminal causality. In other words, we doubt it would
be possible to create an experiment where nonlocal effects in the brain would
be detected in a superluminal way.
Here we need to differentiate our use of nonlocality from what is some-
times found in the literature on quantum cognition (Nelson et al., 2003). Some-
times, authors consider a violation of some form of Bell’s inequalities (Bell, 1964,
1966) as evidence of nonlocality. However, from our discussion, the correlated
quantities must be measured such that no superluminal signal explaining the
correlations is possible, otherwise a violation of Bell’s inequalities would only
imply a contextuality (Suppes et al., 1996a). Classical fields, such as the electro-
magnetic fields used by Khrennikov, also exhibit contextuality, violating Bell’s
inequalities and not allowing for certain configurations a joint probability distri-
bution (Suppes et al., 1996b). Here we are using nonlocality in the strict sense
of “spooky” action-at-a-distance correlations that cannot be explained without
using superluminal interactions.
This brings us to the last quantum-like issue we wish to discuss: contex-
tuality. Early on, the wave description of a particle led physicists to realize,
through Fourier’s theorem, that it was impossible to simultaneously assign val-
ues of momentum and position to it. This developed into the concept of comple-
mentarity. Without trying to be too technical, we can say that two observables
are complementary when they cannot be simultaneously observed, i.e., when
the corresponding hermitian operators Oˆ1 and Oˆ2 for such properties does not
6We are summarizing a very complex and subtle discussion in a few sentences. The reader
interested in more details and in a mathematically rigorous treatment is directed to Suppes
(2002) and references therein.
7Or abandon realism, in the sense that the act of measurement of an observer (a free choice
of the experimenter) determines the existence of the quantity being measured (though realist
theories may also have other problems; see de Barros et al. (2007)).
14
commute ([Oˆ1, Oˆ2] 6= 0). But the question is not whether we can measure Oˆ1
and Oˆ2 simultaneously, but whether we can assign those properties values even
when we cannot measure them. In other words, can we generate a data table
that fills out the values of Oˆ1 and Oˆ2 for every trial? If the number of observ-
ables is large enough, the answer to that question was given in the negative
first by Bell (1966), who showed that any attempts to fill out such tables would
result in values inconsistent with those predicted by quantum mechanics, and
later by Kochen and Specker (1975). In other words, there are quantum systems
whose observables cannot be assigned values when we do not measure them, and
therefore we cannot provide a consistent joint probability distribution for such
observables (de Barros and Suppes, 2000, 2001, 2010; de Barros, 2011)8.
This impossibility of defining a joint probability distribution is related to the
change of values of the random variables when contexts change. For example, a
random variable O1 representing Oˆ1 the outcomes of an experiment may not be
the same random variable when Oˆ2 is being measured. Such random variables
change with the context. Contextuality is not new in physics, nor in psychology.
It happens in classical systems, such as with the classical electromagnetic field
(de Barros and Suppes, 2009). However, we claim it is contextuality, with its
associated impossibility of defining joint probability distributions, that leads to
quantum-like events in brain processing.
At this point, it is important to raise the issue of how much of the quantum
mechanical apparatus is needed to describe brain processes. Quantum mechan-
ics brings to the table more than just contextuality, nonlocality, and nondeter-
minism. It also brings an additional mathematical structure, formalized by the
algebra of observables on a Hilbert space, initially advocated by von Neumann
(1996). To see this, let us examine the following case, analyzed in details by
Suppes and Zanotti (1981); Suppes et al. (1996a). Let X, Y, and Z be three
±1-valued random variables with observed pairwise joint expectations given by
E (XY) = E (XZ) = E (YZ) = −ǫ,
where ǫ > 1/3. Suppes and Zanotti (1981) showed that such expectations are
not consistent with the existence of a joint probability distribution for X, Y,
and Z if
−1 ≤ E (XY) + E (XZ) + E (YZ) ≤ 1 + 2min {E (XY) , E (XZ) , E (YZ)} .
Thus, if they represent the outcomes of local measurements, they are contextual.
If, on the other hand, they each represent space-like separated measurement
events, they are non-local. And each random variable is indistinguishable from a
tossed coin, and are therefore nondeterministic9. However, X, Y, and Z cannot
8Though with the redefinition of what constitutes a particle, local models reproducing
many of the characteristics of quantum mechanics non-locality are possible. See, for example,
Suppes and de Barros (1994b,a); Suppes et al. (1996c,d) for a particular approach.
9The distinction between nondeterministic and deterministic is a complicated and subtle
one, c.f. Suppes and de Barros (1996), and we refrain from it in this paper. The interested
reader should also refer to Werndl (2009).
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represent quantum mechanical observables, as, since they all commute, we could
in principle simultaneously observe X, Y, and Z, which is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a joint probability distribution10. But we could, on the
other hand, imagine a social-science or psychology example (albeit probably a
contrived one) where correlations such as the ones exhibited above could appear.
Furthermore, as shown by de Barros (2012), such random variable correlations
can be obtained from the same neural oscillator model from section 2.
In this section we discussed the different ways in which quantum-like pro-
cesses may show up in the brain. We argued that among them, the most prob-
able is contextuality. Contextuality may appear in a system for several rea-
sons. For example, certain systems evolve according to a dynamic dependent
on boundary conditions, and those may change with the context. Additionally,
a complex system may have different parts that can interfere, changing their
behavior due to alterations in the conditions of other parts. The latter pos-
sibility is mainly what Khrennikov (2011) explored in his field model. In the
next section, we will show that the complex interaction of neural oscillators are
another plausible explanation for quantum-like behavior in the brain.
3.2. Quantum-like effects in decision-making
The experimental violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle (STP) is con-
sidered an example of a quantum-like decision making, so, let us start with a
description of the STP. Savage presents the following example.
“A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He
considers the outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the
attractiveness of the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself,
he asks whether he should buy if he knew that the Republican can-
didate were going to win, and decides that he would do so. Similarly,
he considers whether he would buy if he new that the Democratic
candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would do so.
Seeing that he would buy in either event, he decides that he should
buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or will ob-
tain, as we would ordinarily say. It is all too seldom that a decision
can be arrived at on the basis of the principle used by this business-
man, but, except possibly for the assumption of simple ordering, I
know of no other extralogical principle governing decisions that finds
such ready acceptance.” (Savage, 1972, pg. 21)
The idea illustrated is that if X (buying) is preferred to Y (not buying) under
condition A (Republican wins) and also under condition ¬A (Democrat wins),
then X is preferred to Y . Savage calls this the sure-thing principle.
10This comes from the fact that, since they commute with each other, there exists a set of
orthogonal base vectors in the Hilbert space representation such that the observables corre-
sponding to X, Y, and Z, namely Xˆ, Yˆ , and Zˆ, are all diagonal in this base.
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Putting it in a more formal way, consider the following three propositions,
A, X , and Y , and let P (X |A), the conditional probability of X given A, rep-
resent a measure of a rational belief on whether X is true given that A is true.
Since the measure P requires rationality of belief, it follows that it satisfies Kol-
mogorov’s axioms of probability (Jaynes, 2003; Galavotti, 2005). We start with
the assumption that
P (X |A) > P (Y |A).
This expression can be interpreted as stating that if A is true, thenX is preferred
over Y. If we also assume
P (X |¬A) > P (Y |¬A),
then we obtain, multiplying each inequality by P (A) and P (¬A), respectively,
P (X |A)P (A) + P (X |¬A)P (¬A) > P (Y |A)P (A) + P (Y |¬A)P (¬A) .
From P (A&¬A) = 1 and the definition of conditional probabilities we have
P (X) > P (Y ).
In other words, if we prefer X from Y when A is true, and we also prefer X
from Y when ¬A is true, then we should prefer X over Y regardless of whether
A is true. This, of course, is equivalent to the Savage’s example.
Though STP should hold if agents are making rational decisions, Tversky and Shafir
(1992) and Shafir and Tversky (1992) showed that it was violated by decision
makers. In Tversky and Shafir (1992), they presented several simple decision-
making problems to Stanford students. For example, in one question students
were told about a game of chance, to be played in two steps. In the first step,
not voluntary, players had a 50% probability of winning $200 and 50% of loosing
$100. In the second step, a choice needed to be made: whether to gamble once
again or not. If a player accepted a second gamble, the same odds and payoffs
would be at stake. When told that that they won the first bet, 69% of subjects
said they would gamble again on the second step. When told they lost, 59% of
the subjects also said they would gamble again. Following the discussion above,
we translate the experiment into the following propositions.
A = "Won first bet,"
¬A = "Lost first bet,"
X = "Accept second gamble,"
Y = "Reject second gamble,"
and we have that
P (X |A) = 0.69 > P (Y |A) = 0.31,
and
P (X |¬A) = 0.59 > P (Y |¬A) = 0.41,
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since P (X) = 1 − P (Y ), as X = ¬Y . Clearly, X is preferred over Y regardless
of A. Later on the semester, the same problem was presented, but this time
students were not told whether the bet was won or not in the first round. In
other words, they had to make a decision between X and Y without knowing
whether A or ¬A. This time, 64% of students chose to reject the second gamble,
and 36% chose to accept it. Since in this case
P (X) = 0.36 < P (Y ) = 0.64,
there is a clear violation of the STP.
3.3. Violation of the sure-thing-principle with neural oscillators
We now turn to the representation of the above situation in terms of neural
oscillators. Following Tversky and Shafir (1992), we call “Won/Lost Version”
the case when students were told about A, and the “Disjunctive Version” when
students were not told about A. Let us start with the Won/Lost Version. In
the simplest case, we have two stimulus oscillators corresponding to the stim-
uli associated to the brain representation of A and ¬A. Let us call sa (t) the
oscillator corresponding to A, and sa (t) to ¬A. As before, response oscillators
are r1 (t) and r2 (t). For simplicity, we assume that all oscillators have the same
natural frequency ωi = ω0. We emphasize that this is not a necessary assump-
tion, but since the dynamics will lead to synchronization, this will make the
overall computations simpler. Then, when sa is activated, so are the response
oscillators, and the dynamics is given by
ϕ˙sa = ω0 − kEsa,r1 sin (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kEsa,r2 sin (ϕsa − ϕr2)
−kIsa,r1 cos (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kIsa,r2 cos (ϕsa − ϕr2) , (26)
ϕ˙r1 = ω0 − kEr1,sa sin (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kEr1,r2 sin (ϕr1 − ϕr2)
−kIr1,sa cos (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kIr1,r2 cos (ϕr1 − ϕr2) , (27)
ϕ˙r2 = ω0 − kEr2,r1 sin (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kEr2,sa sin (ϕr2 − ϕsa)
−kIr2,r1 cos (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kIr2,sa cos (ϕr2 − ϕsa ) . (28)
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For such a system, it is possible to show (Suppes et al., 2012, Appendix) that a
response x is selected when
kEsa,r1 = αx, (29)
kEsa,r2 = −αx, (30)
kEr1,r2 = −α, (31)
kEr1,sa = αx, (32)
kEr2,sa = −αx, (33)
kEr2,r1 = −α, (34)
and
kIsa,r1 = α
√
1− x2, (35)
kIsa,r2 = −α
√
1− x2, (36)
kIr1,r2 = 0, (37)
kIr1,sa = −α
√
1− x2, (38)
kIr2,sa = α
√
1− x2, (39)
kIr2,r1 = 0, (40)
where α is a coupling strength parameter that determines how fast the solution
converges to the phase differences given in (13). We have similar equations for
sa (t), namely
ϕ˙sa = ω0 − kEsa,r1 sin (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kEsa,r2 sin (ϕsa − ϕr2)
−kIsa,r1 cos (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kIsa,r2 cos (ϕsa − ϕr2) , (41)
ϕ˙r1 = ω0 − kEr1,sa sin (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kEr1,r2 sin (ϕr1 − ϕr2)
−kIr1,sa cos (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kIr1,r2 cos (ϕr1 − ϕr2) , (42)
ϕ˙r2 = ω0 − kEr2,r1 sin (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kEr2,sa sin (ϕr2 − ϕsa)
−kIr2,r1 cos (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kIr2,sa cos (ϕr2 − ϕsa ) , (43)
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Figure 1: Histogram density of 300 oscillator models reinforced using the dynamics given in
equations (21)–(23) for y = 0.5. The histogram was obtained using 6300 points corresponding
to 300 oscillators and 21 reinforcement trials per set of oscillators (trials 40 to 60). All
parameters used were the same as those described in Suppes et al. (2012), and K
′
0 was set to
4, 500. The fitted Gaussian has µ = 0.51 and σ = 0.05, with p < 10−3.
and the equivalent equations for (29)–(40).
Equations (26)–(40) determine a given phase relation for a response x in a
continuous interval, but they do not necessarily model the discrete case of a se-
lecting X over Y . To do so, let us recall that because of the stochasticity of the
initial conditions, if a particular value x is conditioned through couplings (29)–
(40), such response is selected according to a smearing distribution K(x|ksa ).
In fact, if f (y) is a simple reinforcement given by a Dirac delta function cen-
tered in z, i.e. f(y) = δ(y − z), then the response distribution r(x) becomes
asymptotically (Suppes, 1959)
r(x) =
ˆ 1
−1
ksa(x|y)δ(y − z)dy = ks(x|z),
i.e. r(x) coincides with the smearing distribution at the point of reinforcement
z. Thus, by using a reinforcement density given by a Dirac delta function
centered at z, we are able to obtain the shape of the smearing distribution from
the oscillator dynamics. Figure 1 shows the density histogram for a MATLAB
simulation of the three oscillator model. Not surprisingly, the model’s smearing
distribution ks(x|z) fits well a Gaussian
ks (x|z) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−z)2
2σ2 ,
where σ = 0.05. We should mention that the estimation of the smearing distri-
bution from a reinforcement schedule given by the Dirac delta function is not
realistic for real psychological experiments. However, because we are running
simulations without taking into consideration other behavioral and environmen-
tal aspects, we are able to extract ks(x|y) from it.
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With the smearing distribution, we may now describe how a stochastic de-
cision making processes may happen in the brain. Let X and Y be two of the
possible responses for a certain behavioral experiment. In our model, response
X would be associated with an oscillator, r1 (t), and Y with the other, r2 (t). If
I1 = 2A
2 and I2 = 0, then the response would clearly be I1. Since −1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
x given by 16, we may state that x > 0 corresponds to a response X and x ≤ 0
to response Y . If we do this, when the reinforcement is a value different from 1
or −1, there is a nonzero chance, given by the smearing distribution, to select
each response. In other words, say a stimulus sa is conditioned to −1 ≤ z ≤ 1.
Then,
P (X) =
ˆ 1
0
ksa (x|z) dx
≈ 1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
z√
2σ
)
and
P (Y ) =
ˆ 0
−1
ksa (x|z) dx
≈ 1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
z√
2σ
)
,
for |z| , σ ≪ 1, where erf (x) is the error function. So, we can use the expression
z =
√
2σerf−1 (2P (R1)− 1)
to estimate the reinforcement value z leading to the desired probabilities of
responses. Let us summarize the oscillator implementation of the Won/Lost
version. We started with two stimulus, either Won or Lost, corresponding to
the oscillators sa (t) and sa (t). Once sa (t) or sa (t) are activated, the dynamics
of the system leads to a selection of eitherX or Y , corresponding to the decisions
of betting or not betting on the next step of the game.
We now model the “Disjunctive Version.” Because the response Win or Lost
is not known, we assume that both oscillators sa (t) and sa (t) are activated
simultaneously. Furthermore, since the subject also knows that we either Win
or we Lose, oscillators sa (t) and sa (t) are incompatible, in the sense that they
must represent off-phase oscillations in an SR-oscillator model. Therefore, the
response system is composed not only of three oscillators, but four: the two
stimulus and the two response oscillators. The equivalent dynamical expressions
for (26)–(43) when both oscillators are activated are the following.
ϕ˙sa = ω0 − kEsa,r1 sin (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kEsa,r2 sin (ϕsa − ϕr2)
−kIsa,sa cos (ϕsa − ϕsa)
−kIsa,r1 cos (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kIsa,r2 cos (ϕsa − ϕr2) , (44)
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ϕ˙sa = ω0 − kEsa,r1 sin (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kEsa,r2 sin (ϕsa − ϕr2)
−kIsa,sa cos (ϕsa − ϕsa)
−kIsa,r1 cos (ϕsa − ϕr1)
−kIsa,r2 cos (ϕsa − ϕr2) , (45)
ϕ˙r1 = ω0 − kEr1,sa sin (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kEr1,sa sin (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kEr1,r2 sin (ϕr1 − ϕr2)
−kIr1,sa cos (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kIr1,sa cos (ϕr1 − ϕsa)
−kIr1,r2 cos (ϕr1 − ϕr2) , (46)
ϕ˙r2 = ω0 − kEr2,r1 sin (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kEr2,sa sin (ϕr2 − ϕsa)
−kEr2,sa sin (ϕr2 − ϕsa)
−kIr2,r1 cos (ϕr2 − ϕr1)
−kIr2,sa cos (ϕr2 − ϕsa )
−kIr2,sa cos (ϕr2 − ϕsa ) , (47)
with the couplings between sa and r1 and r2 as well as sa and r1 and r2 being
the same, but
kIsa,sa = α
′. (48)
As mentioned above, the parameter α′ in (48) represents a measure of the the
degree of incompatibility of stimulus oscillators sa (t) and sa (t).
Now, as above, let I ′1 be the mean intensity at r1 (t) given by
I ′1 =
〈
(sa(t) + sa (t) + r1(t))
2
〉
,
where this time we have both sa (t) and sa (t) contributing to the intensity.
Defining δϕr1,a ≡ ϕr1 − ϕsa and δϕr1,a ≡ ϕr1 − ϕsa , it is straightforward to
show that
I ′1 = A
2
(
3
2
+ cos (δϕr1,a) + cos (δϕr1,a) + cos (δϕr1,a − δϕr1,a)
)
.
Similarly, for r2 (t) we have
I ′2 = A
2
(
3
2
+ cos (δϕr2,a) + cos (δϕr2,a) + cos (δϕr2,a − δϕr2,a)
)
.
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We notice that, because we now have more oscillators, extra interference terms
shows up in the intensity. We now use the new intensities, I ′1 and I
′
2 to compute
the response, using
b′ =
I ′1 − I ′2
I ′1 + I
′
2
.
At this point, we should remark on the appearance of quantum-like effects.
The model we are using, of interfering oscillators, carry some similarities with
the famous two-slit experiment (Suppes and de Barros, 1994a). In the two-slit
experiment, a quantum particle can go through two slits, and then hit a phos-
phorous screen, thus being detected. Since a particle is a localized object, going
through one slit should mean no interaction with the other slit, and therefore
we should expect to make no difference whether we keep the other slit closed
or open. However, if we open both slits, we observe different probability pat-
terns than if we close one of the slits. In other words, if we close one of the
slits, and therefore know through which slit the particle went through, we get
a probability of observing the particle in a certain region of the screen. If, on
the other hand, we do not close one of the slits, we do not know through which
slit it went, and when we do not know, the probability of detecting the particle
changes. Formally, let L be the proposition “went through the slit on the left
because the slit on the right was closed,” R =“went through the slit on the right
because the slit on the left was closed,” and A =“was observed at a certain
region on the screen.” Then, it is possible to choose a region on the screen such
that
P (A|R) > P (¬A|R) ,
and
P (A|L) > P (¬A|L) ,
i.e., such that there are more particles being detected on it than outside of it.
However, because of quantum interference, if we do not close the slits, and do
not know where they went, it is again possible to have an A such that the above
holds and
P (A) < P (¬A) .
This is the two slit formal equivalent of the violation of STP.
Now, let us go back to the oscillator model. For the the Win/Lost Version,
a single stimulus oscillator is active at a time. Such oscillator produces a dy-
namics that leads to a certain balance between the responses X and Y . This
corresponds to one slit open, when there is no interference from the other slit.
However, for the Disjunctive Version, both oscillators are active, and their ac-
tivity interferes with each other, in a way similar to the interference from the
two-slit experiment. The strength of interference, i.e. the degree of coherence
between the two oscillators, is determined by the inhibitory coupling parame-
ter kIsa,sa . Therefore, when both oscillators are active, we obtain a probability
distribution violating the standard axioms of probability, and consequently STP.
To end this section, let us look at a simulation of the violation of the STP
using neural oscillators. We simulated in Matlab R2012a the oscillators’ dynam-
ics determined by equations (26)–(43) and (44)–(48) using the Dormand-Prince
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method. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, all oscillators were as-
sumed to have the same frequency of 11 Hz, as this would allow the use of the
couplings given by (35)–(40) and (48) without having to invoke learning equa-
tions, as in (Suppes et al., 2012). For our system, the parameters utilized were
the following: ∆tr = 0.2 s, σϕ =
√
π/4, kEsa,r1 = −kEsa,r2 = kEr1,sa = kEr2,sa =
−0.011 Hz, kEr1,r2 = kEr2,r1 = −11 Hz, kIsa,r1 = −kIsa,r2 = −kIr1,sa = kIr2,sa = 1,
kEsa,r1 = −kEsa,r2 = kEr1,sa = kEr2,sa = −0.017 Hz, kIsa,r1 = −kIsa,r2 = −kIr1,sa =
kIr2,sa = 1, k
I
r1,r2
= kIr2,r1 = 0, and k
I
sa,sa
= kIsa,sa = −0.011, where ∆tr is
the time of response after the onset of stimulus, and σϕ is the variance of the
initial conditions for the phase oscillators. We ran 1,000 trials with the above
parameter values, for the Win/Lost Version we obtained X as response 63%
when the Lost oscillator was used and 58% with the Win oscillator. However,
for the Disjunctive Version, when the two oscillators were active, we obtained
X as a response 36% of the runs, clearly showing a violation of Savage’s STP
and an interference effect, as expected.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we presented a neural oscillator model based on reasonable
assumptions about the behavior of coupled neurons. We then showed that
the predictions of such model presents interference effects between incompat-
ible stimulus oscillators. Such interference leads to computation of responses
which are inconsistent with standard probability laws, but are consistent with
quantum-like effects in decision making processes Busemeyer et al. (2009). Of
course, the fact that we get interference from s1 and s2 does not preclude us from
necessarily making rational decisions. We could, for example, modify the above
model, and include an extra oscillator, such that after reinforcement we could
eliminate interference, therefore satisfying the STP. But our model suggests that
a plausible mechanism for quantum effects in the brain may not need to rely on
actual quantum processes, as advocated by Penrose (1989), but instead can be
a consequence of neuronal “interference.”
One interesting feature of the oscillator model is that the amount of inter-
ference between the oscillators is determined by the couplings between s1 and
s2. The stronger the incompatibility between the two stimulus, the more we
should see interference between the responses. Furthermore, because interfer-
ence is a consequence of inhibitory couplings, we could in principle design exper-
iments where pharmacological interventions could suppress inhibitory synapses,
destroying such interference effects.
An attentive reader may question the possibility of modeling decision-making
processes from neurons. In particular, how can we account for what Pattee
claims are non-holonomic constraints not internalized by the dynamics (Pattee,
1972, 2001, 2012). To address this issue, let us examine this claim in more
detail. First, we should notice that there are many examples of non-holonomic
constraints in physical systems that are determined by an underlying and well-
understood dynamics. For example, a ball rolling without slipping on a flat
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surface satisfies such type of constraint. But most physicists would not think
that such an example presents fundamental difficulties to the description of the
system ball-surface. In this case, what is a constraint and what is a physical
system is just a matter of computational convenience. As a trained physicists
himself, we believe this is not what Pattee meant.
For Pattee, decision making processes require the type of discontinuous jump
that cannot be associated to classical dynamical systems, but can be thought
of as determined by non-holonomic constraints in a classical dynamics. Since
the fundamental laws of physics do not have such characteristics, he reasons,
it remains a mystery how they emerge from complex systems. He goes on to
propose that the jumps come from the emergence of quantum decoherence (using
the modern parlance).
Going back to the model presented here, the question remains on how we can
derive such emergent characteristics. First, we emphasize that we are not mod-
eling decision making processes from basic physics, but instead from emerging
properties of collections of neurons. In other words, we are assuming an emerg-
ing dynamics with the necessary features described by Pattee (1972): nonlin-
earity and time-dependent dynamics (Guckenheimer and Holmes, 1983). For
instance, overall dynamics of a highly complex system of interacting neurons
is modeled mathematically with nonlinear equations describing the behavior
of phases (which adds to the nonlinearity). Furthermore, the decision-making
dynamics changes in time by reinforcements which are outside of the dynami-
cal system itself (Suppes et al., 2012). Such reinforcements are not only time-
dependent, but can also be viewed as non-holonomic constraints to the dynam-
ics. Thus, in a certain sense, we are not addressing the fundamental problem
posed by Pattee, but we do push it to another level in the description of neural
interactions.
It is also important to clarify the relationship between our model and quan-
tum mechanics. We are not claiming that we derive quantum mechanics from
neuronal dynamics. We are showing that certain quantum-like features (but not
all; see de Barros and Suppes, 2009, for details) are present in our model. In
other words, we start with a classical stochastic description and obtain some
quantum-like results. This is to be contrasted with Pattee, who argues that
classical-like dynamics emerges from a quantum world, and such emergence
happens with the appearance of life itself11.
We end this paper with a comparison between our model and the one pro-
posed by Khrennikov (2011). Whereas in Khrennikov’s model the interference
of electromagnetic fields account for quantum-like effects in the brain, in our
model we use Kuramoto oscillators to describe the evolution of coupled sets of
dynamical oscillators close to Andronov-Hopf bifurcations. Because such os-
cillators obey a wave equation, they are subject to interference. So, in some
11In an earlier paper (Suppes and de Barros, 2007), we actually discussed the limits of quan-
tum effects in decision-making processes, and proposed an experiment where the entanglement
of photons could be used to condition an insect.
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sense, we may say that the oscillator and the field models are equivalent repre-
sentations of quantum-like interference in the brain. However, though we can
think of the weak couplings between oscillators originating from the synapses
between neurons, it is also conceivable that the weak oscillating electric fields
generated by sets of oscillators provide sufficient additional coupling to account
for their synchronization and interference. Thus, we believe that there are
not only equivalencies between the models, but also that our oscillator model
might provide an underlying neurophysiological justification for Khrennikov’s
quantum-like field processing. It would be interesting to prove some representa-
tion theorem between neural oscillators and Khrennikov’s field model. However,
this seems implausible, since it was shown in de Barros (2012) that oscillators
may generate processes that are not representable in terms of observables in a
Hilbert space, and Khrennikov’s model relies on a quantum representation of
states in terms of Hilbert spaces.
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